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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this case, we must decide whether an estate is entitled 
to a theft loss deduction under the federal tax code for 
funds wrongfully paid out from an estate and never 
returned. The decedent, Philip Meriano, left an estate that 
included over one million dollars worth of bearer bonds. 
The bonds had been stolen from Meriano but were later 
returned to the estate. Excessive fees and costs were 
charged against the estate by the stockbroker and the 
attorney/investigator who had retrieved the bonds and 
administered the estate. The IRS assessed the estate with a 
deficiency. The estate then claimed before the U.S. Tax 
Court that the stockbroker and the attorney/investigator 
had committed theft under Pennsylvania state law and that 
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the estate was therefore entitled to a deduction for its loss 
pursuant to 26 U.S.C. S 2054. The tax court denied the 
deduction and the estate appealed. For the following 
reasons, we will reverse the tax court's decision and allow 
the estate its deduction. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
The facts of this case were set forth in great detail by the 
tax court. We will recount only those facts that are relevant 
to the issues on appeal. Philip Meriano died on November 
14, 1977. Four months earlier, a fire at Meriano's residence 
had destroyed documentation of his ownership of municipal 
bearer bonds with a face value of approximately two million 
dollars. Not long after the fire, Meriano notified the 
Philadelphia Police Department that the bonds themselves 
were missing from a safe located in an area of the residence 
damaged by the fire. 
 
When Meriano died, his elderly sister, Mary Orlando, was 
appointed administratrix of his estate, under the 
assumption that he had died intestate. With the help of her 
husband, Anthony, Mary Orlando attempted to locate the 
missing securities. She was not successful until her 
husband asked Edward Reardon, a stock broker, for help. 
Reardon, in turn, contacted John Lynch, an attorney and 
investment banker who had experience in the field of 
municipal bonds. 
 
On August 7, 1978, Mary Orlando signed a contingent fee 
agreement with Lynch to compensate him in the event he 
recovered any of the missing securities. Under the 
agreement, Lynch was to receive one-third of the face value 
of any securities recovered prior to the filing of a lawsuit. If 
any securities were recovered after suit was filed, Lynch 
was to receive forty percent of the face value. Orlando and 
Lynch both signed the document; Orlando's husband, 
Anthony, and her daughter, Connie Kates, both signed as 
witnesses. The agreement contained no provision for 
Reardon's payment, nor did Reardon sign it. See Appendix, 
at 52. 
 
Shortly after executing his agreement with Orlando, 
Lynch entered into a separate agreement with Reardon, 
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under which Reardon would assist Lynch with his search 
for the stolen bonds and Lynch would compensate him with 
15 percent of the face value of any of the securities that 
were recovered. 
 
Lynch and Reardon eventually traced the securities to an 
account held by Philip Meriano's former housekeeper, Italia 
Bossi. Based on information from Reardon and Lynch, the 
FBI on May 1, 1979, was able to confiscate bearer bonds 
having a value of $1,823,000 from the Bossi's residence in 
San Diego. Bossi and her husband were brought back to 
Philadelphia, where they were charged with arson and 
theft. Their trial resulted in a hung jury. After the 
government failed to convict them, the Bossis requested 
that the FBI return the bonds to them. 
 
In December 1979, Lynch retained his brother's law firm, 
Groen, Smolow and Lynch, to assist the estate in any civil 
suits necessary to protect the value of the recovered bearer 
bonds. Lynch also retained Groen, Smolow as general 
counsel for the estate. When the U.S. Attorney decided in 
1980 to forego a second trial of the Bossis, the estate and 
the Bossis both filed civil actions in the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to get control of the 
securities. 
 
That same year, the estate settled the suits with the 
Bossis. Under the settlement agreement, the estate 
recovered securities with a face value of $1,623,000 and a 
fair market value of $1,146,446. Without the help of Lynch 
and Reardon, the estate would have not recovered these 
securities. 
 
Along with the Green, Smolow law firm, Lynch continued 
to represent the estate. On April 10, 1980, Lynch and 
Anthony Orlando deposited the recovered securities in a 
safety deposit box at the Provident bank. That same day, 
Lynch and Reardon signed a "hold harmless" agreement 
with Mary Orlando. The agreement stated in pertinent part: 
 
       Dated as of this 10th day of April, 1980, in 
       consideration of the disbursement of certain funds 
       deemed earned as professional fees pursuant to prior 
       agreements with Mary Orlando, in her capacity as the 
       duly appointed Administratrix of the Estate of Philip 
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       Meriano, Edward J. Reardon, Jr. and John T. Lynch 
       Jr., Esquire, agree(s) to INDEMNIFY AND HOLD 
       HARMLESS the Estate of Philip Meriano and Mary 
       Orlando, the Administratrix of the Estate and against 
       any and all claims and loss, which the Estate and/or 
       the Administratrix may hereafter suffer or pay by 
       reason of any claims against the Estate or the 
       Administratrix or as a result of the disbursement of 
       said funds of the Estate in payment of professional fees 
       and hereby agree to repay any and all amounts 
       received that are determined by a court of proper 
       jurisdiction to be returnable to the Estate. 
 
Appendix, at 109 (emphasis added). Both Reardon and 
Lynch signed the agreement. 
 
Sometime after this agreement was executed, Lynch 
transferred the securities from the safety deposit bank to 
an account at Kidder, Peabody & Co. On April 29, 1980, 
Mary Orlando signed an agreement authorizing Lynch to 
buy, sell or otherwise transact business with the securities. 
Under the terms of this agreement, Orlando agreed that she 
would "waive notification . . . of any of the aforementioned 
transactions and delivery of any statements, notices, or 
demands pertaining thereto and hereby ratify any and all 
transactions heretofore or hereafter made by [Lynch] on or 
for [the] account." Appendix, at 110. 
 
In addition to creating the estate's account, Lynch and 
Reardon also established individual accounts with Kidder, 
Peabody. Over the next three years, Lynch transferred some 
of the estate's bonds to his individual account. From this 
account, Lynch liquidated the securities and used the 
proceeds to pay himself and Reardon, and also to pay the 
Groen, Smolow law firm, which sought fees for general 
services to the estate and for costs associated with the 
recovery of the stolen bonds. The trial record reflects that 
Lynch did not keep organized records of the transfers of the 
bonds from the safe deposit box to the estate's Kidder, 
Peabody account. Similarly, Lynch did not record in an 
organized fashion the withdrawals from the estate's account 
at Kidder to his own individual account. See Appendix, at 
272-273. 
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On December 9, 1980, Mary Orlando filed a petition with 
the Orphans' Court for approval of attorney and related fees 
paid to Lynch and Reardon. Because there was some 
uncertainty as to the proper personal representative of the 
estate (see discussion below), the Orphans' Court deferred 
action on the petition until the estate filed an accounting 
with the auditing judge of the court. See Appendix, at 87. 
Notwithstanding the court's deferral, however, Orlando 
approved payment of $418,250 to Lynch and $250,950 to 
Reardon in a document signed by Mary Orlando and 
witnessed by her husband and her daughter.3 
 
The Will Contest 
 
In August of 1980, Anita Panepinto, a niece of Meriano's 
deceased wife, discovered a will executed by Meriano and 
dated November 17, 1973. She also found a codicil, dated 
December 2, 1973. The will and codicil named Panepinto 
and another niece, Elaine Hernardi, as beneficiaries of the 
estate. On August 30, 1980, Panepinto presented the will to 
the Register of Wills in Philadelphia. 
 
Two years later, the will recovered by Anita Panepinto 
was admitted to probate. The Register of Wills then revoked 
Mary Orlando's position as administratrix and appointed 
Panepinto as administratrix, c.t.a (cum testamento annexo).4 
In 1983, Panepinto filed a motion in the tax court to 
substitute herself for Mary Orlando as the estate 
representative in the present proceeding. 
 
Orlando and Kates contested the will. By 1986, however, 
Panepinto and Orlando had resolved their differences and 
agreed to settle their competing claims to the Meriano 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. This agreement is marked "approved by court 3-9-81." This notation 
refers to an order by Judge John B. Hannum, of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, approving fees. 
Judge Hannum had presided over the litigation between the estate and 
the Bossis with regard to the disposition of the stolen securities. On 
October 2, 1981, Judge Hannum vacated this order of approval on the 
ground that he had lacked ancillary jurisdiction to approve the fees in 
the first place. See Appendix, at 108; 138-139; 426-27. 
 
4. An administrator c.t.a. has the same powers as an executor of an 
estate. See 20 Pa. C.S. S 3325. 
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estate. Under the terms of the settlement, Panepinto agreed 
to release Orlando and her surety, INA, from any future 
surcharge liability. Orlando and Kates withdrew their will 
contest on December 19, 1986. 
 
The Orphans' Court Proceedings 
 
On March 30, 1983, Panepinto filed two petitions with 
the Orphans' Court, which sought reimbursement of all 
fees paid to Lynch and Reardon. According to Panepinto, 
the fees were grossly excessive, and the agreements signed 
by Orlando, the former administratrix, were unconscionable 
as a matter of law. 
 
In an attempt to determine what was left in the estate 
and what Lynch had disbursed to himself and his 
colleagues, the Orphans' Court ordered Mary Orlando to file 
an accounting with the court. Orlando, who was by this 
time represented solely by Lynch and no longer by the 
Groen Smolow law firm, did not do so. As a result, the 
Insurance Company of North America (INA), which had 
acted as surety on Orlando's administratrix bond, filed the 
requested accounting with the court. According to the 
testimony of Robert Boote, an attorney retained by INA, 
Lynch had failed to maintain organized records for the 
estate and had not been forthcoming in providing 
appropriate records. 
 
Boote prepared a First and Final Account of Mary 
Orlando, which INA, as surety, filed on March 30, 1983. 
That account showed that the estate had paid Reardon 
$220,000 in fees and Lynch $415,761 in fees. INA 
eventually attributed additional fees to Lynch, for a total of 
$500,761.19. Reardon also received an additional $30,950 
from Lynch on April 15, 1981, for a total of $250,950. See 
Appendix at 584. 
 
Judge Kendall Shoyer of the Orphans' Court conducted 
an audit of the estate between May 2, 1986, and March 24, 
1987. Judge Shoyer then considered Panepinto's motion to 
reduce or deny part or all of the fees paid out by the estate 
to Lynch and Reardon. As a result of the audit, Judge 
Shoyer ordered Lynch and Reardon to reimburse a portion 
of their fees to the estate. In doing so, Judge Shoyer 
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criticized Lynch's poor ethics as an attorney, particularly 
Lynch's unilateral removal of the securities from the estate, 
his failure to keep adequate records, and his failure to 
cooperate with the preparer of the account. See Estate of 
Meriano, No. 2259 (Orphans' Court Division, Court of 
Common Pleas of Philadelphia, filed September 21,1988). 
 
With regard to Lynch's fee, Judge Shoyer held that a 
reasonable fee should be based on the fair market value 
and not the face value of the securities, notwithstanding 
Lynch's written agreement with Orlando. In addition, Judge 
Shoyer held that Lynch's contingent fee should be reduced 
from 40 percent to 35 percent of the fair market value of 
the bonds due to his lack of cooperation with INA's 
preparation of the estate's final account. Finally, Judge 
Shoyer allowed Lynch to credit only a portion of the fees he 
had paid out to the Groen, Smolow law firm. As a result, 
the Orphans' Court judged Reardon liable for $78,983.10, 
plus six percent interest from the dates he received the 
funds from the estate. Judge Shoyer assessed Lynch's debt 
to the estate to be $99,505.09, which represented the 
difference between the amount he had taken and the 
amount to which he was entitled. Judge Shoyer added 
$7,500 to this amount due to Lynch's failure to account for 
unexplained "costs" for which he had disbursed funds from 
the estate on February 16, 1980. 
 
All of the parties took exception to the court's 
adjudication. As a result, the Orphans' Court sitting en 
banc reheard the case and issued a new schedule of 
surcharges. See Estate of Meriano, No. 2259 (Orphans' 
Court en banc, filed August 1, 1989). First, the en banc 
court agreed with Judge Shoyer that the contingent fee 
should be based on the fair market and not face value of 
the bonds. In addition, the Orphans' Court sitting en banc 
credited Lynch for several disbursements to the Groen law 
firm that had not been recognized by Judge Shoyer. Lynch's 
surcharge therefore was initially reduced to $23,559.09. 
This reduction, however, did not end the matter of 
excessive fees. 
 
The Orphans' Court expressed concern that, even after 
adjusting Lynch and Reardon's fees for fair market value 
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instead of face value, the fees were still too high. The court 
explained: 
 
       Although the auditing judge does not expressly address 
       the issue, it is clear from the amounts of compensation 
       awarded to Lynch and Reardon that he found that 
       Lynch was to receive 35% of the market value of the 
       [recovered] bonds and that Reardon was to receive 15% 
       of the market value of the bonds that each man was 
       compensated from the gross estate. We are of the 
       opinion that an allowance of 50% of the market value 
       of the assets recovered is unreasonable and excessive 
       and was error for the auditing judge to allow that 
       amount of compensation. 
 
En banc opinion, at 20. According to the Orphans' Court, 
Lynch should have paid Reardon out of his own funds and 
not those contained in the gross estate. Id. The Orphans' 
Court therefore ordered Lynch to pay Reardon's fair market 
fee, $171,966.90, back to the estate, in addition to the 
$23,559.09 he already owed for the overpayment on his 
own fee. In addition, Lynch was to pay six percent interest 
on these sums, from the date of receipt until the day the 
money was reimbursed. Id. 
 
Once more, the parties appealed the decision of the 
Orphans' Court. The Superior Court affirmed it per curiam 
on June 13, 1990. In re Estate of Meriano, 579 A.2d 423 
(Pa. Super. 1990). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
refused to hear Lynch's petition for appeal on January 15, 
1991. In re Estate of Meriano, 593 A.2d 421 (Pa. 1991). 
Thus, Lynch remained liable to the estate for a total sum of 
$195,525.99, plus six percent interest running from the 
date of receipt of the funds.5 Reardon owed the estate 
$78,983.10, plus six percent interest. 
 
Neither Reardon nor Lynch adhered to their obligations. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The parties stipulated that Lynch owed $195,516.00, which is $9.99 
less than the sum of $171,966.90 and $23,559.09. See Joint Stipulation 
of Facts, at P20. This discrepancy, however, appears to be the result of 
a simple arithmetic mistake since the Joint Stipulation states the correct 
sums that were to be added in order to determine Lynch's total liability. 
See id. 
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Lynch attempted to declare bankruptcy in 1989, but had 
his petition dismissed in 1990, due to his failure to file 
required schedules. In his petition for bankruptcy, Lynch 
listed the estate as a creditor for the sum of $225,000. After 
his attempt to declare bankruptcy failed, Lynch never paid 
any of the money he owed to the Meriano estate. 
 
Unlike Lynch, Reardon apparently maintained some 
contact with the estate and entered into a settlement 
agreement for an undisclosed amount that was less than 
the sum charged to him by the Orphans' Court. The tax 
court noted that one of the estate's attorneys filed a status 
report on March 19, 1990, in which the attorney reported 
that all claims against Reardon had been settled. Of the 
amount negotiated by settlement, Reardon paid only 
$25,000. 
 
The Present Proceeding 
 
This proceeding began when the Commissioner served 
the estate with a Notice of Deficiency in the amount of 
$732,106.81. In addition, the estate was assessed 
$366,053.41 for fraud pursuant to 26 U.S.C. S 6653(b). The 
Commissioner commenced proceedings against the estate 
in 1981. Over the last fifteen years, the parties have settled 
many of the issues regarding the estate's tax deficiency. See 
Stipulation of Disposition of Issues, filed September 3, 1985; 
Second Stipulation of Disposition of Issues, filed November 
26, 1993; Joint Stipulation of Facts, filed December 5, 1994. 
 
A special trial judge heard this case in December of 1994. 
The trial judge concluded, inter alia, that the estate was not 
entitled to a theft loss deduction for the funds which Lynch 
and Reardon had failed to return to the estate despite the 
order of the Orphans' Court that they do so. The tax court 
adopted the trial judge's findings and conclusions in an 
opinion filed February 15, 1996. See Estate of Meriano v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1996-58, 1996 WL 64854 
(U.S.T.C. filed February 15, 1996). The estate now appeals 
the tax court's denial of its theft loss deduction. 
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II. DISCUSSION  
 
The tax court determined that the estate was entitled 
neither to a theft loss deduction nor to a deduction for a 
portion of the administrative expenses taken by its 
attorneys. See Estate of Meriano, T.C. Memo 1996-58 at 84, 
101. The estate does not appeal the tax court's disposition 
of issues regarding the deductibility of administrative 
expenses. Consequently, our concern is whether the estate 
is entitled to theft loss deduction for some or all of the 
money owed to it by Reardon and Lynch.6  We exercise 
jurisdiction over the tax court's decision pursuant to 16 
U.S.C. S 7482(a). We review the tax court's legal 
determinations de novo. We do not disturb the tax court's 
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. See Gulf 
Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 914 F.2d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 
1990). 
 
The estate maintains that it is entitled to an appropriate 
theft loss deduction for the portion of Lynch and Reardon's 
withdrawals that were adjudged excessive by the Orphans' 
Court but never reimbursed to the estate. Section 2054 of 
the tax code provides that: 
 
       [T]he value of the taxable estate shall be determined by 
       deducting from the value of the gross estate losses 
       incurred during the settlement of estates arising from 
       fires, storms, shipwrecks, or other casualties, or from 
       theft, when such losses are not compensated for by 
       insurance or otherwise. 
 
26 U.S.C. S 2054. Because Section 2054 has generated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The estate also raises several evidentiary issues on appeal. According 
to the estate, the tax court committed error reversible error when it: (1) 
failed to admit "expert" testimony regarding the proper interpretation of 
Pennsylvania criminal law; (2) refused to admit the Orphans' Court 
opinions as well as the testimony contained within those proceedings of 
Anthony Orlando, who had died by the time the tax court proceeding 
was under way; (3) rejected the estate's request to treat Lynch and 
Reardon as hostile witnesses on direct examination; and (4) prevented 
the estate from proffering evidence that Lynch might have commingled 
funds or hidden assets while he was managing the estate's securities. 
 
In light of our holding, we need not address the merits of these issues. 
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relatively little case law, we must examine those cases that 
have defined "theft" as it appears in Section 165, which 
permits taxpayers to take theft loss deductions on their 
income tax.7 See Estate of Max Schlensky v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Mem. 1977-148, 1997 WL 3444. 
 
"Theft," as it appears in Sections 165 and 2054, is 
defined by the jurisdiction in which the loss has occurred. 
See e.g. Lombard Brothers, Inc. v. United States, 893 F.2d 
520, 523 (2d Cir. 1990); Bagur v. Commissioner, 603 F.2d 
491, 501 (5th Cir. 1979); Bellis v. Commissioner , 540 F.2d 
448, 449 (9th Cir. 1976).8 The estate and Commissioner 
agree that, to the extent state law controls the outcome of 
this case, the applicable law is that of Pennsylvania. See 
Joint Stipulation of Facts, P 28. The estate must prove its 
entitlement to the deduction by a preponderance of 
evidence. See Howard v. United States, 497 F.2d 1270, 
1272 n.4 (7th Cir. 1974); Farcasanu v. Commissioner, 436 
F.2d 146, 150 n.3. (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also Tax Court 
Rule 142(a). 
 
According to the estate, the facts of this case amount to 
theft under two provisions of Pennsylvania's Criminal Code: 
18 Pa.C.S. S 4113, for misapplication of entrusted property; 
and 18 Pa.C.S. S 3927, for theft by failure to make required 
disposition of funds received. Because Section 3927 
adequately resolves this case in the estate's favor, we will 
not consider whether the estate is also eligible for a theft 
loss deduction under Section 4113. 
 
Section 3927 provides in pertinent part: 
 
       (a) Offense defined- A person who obt ains property 
       upon agreement, or subject to a known legal obligation, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Section 165(c)(3) allows a taxpayer to take a deduction for "losses of 
property not connected with a trade or business or a transaction entered 
into for profit, if such losses arise from fire, storm, shipwreck or other 
casualty, or from theft." 26 U.S.C. S165(c)(3). 
 
8. "[T]he exact nature of the crime, whether larceny or embezzlement, of 
obtaining money under false pretenses, swindling or other wrongful 
deprivations of the property of another, is of little importance so long 
as 
it amounts to theft." Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 111 (5th Cir. 
1956). 
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       to make specified payments or other disposition, 
       whether from such property or its proceeds or from his 
       own property to be reserved in equivalent amount, is 
       guilty of theft if he intentionally deals with the property 
       obtained as his own and fails to make the required 
       payment or disposition. The foregoing applies 
       notwithstanding that it may be impossible to identify 
       particular property as belonging to the victim at the 
       time of the failure of the actor to make the required 
       payment or disposition. 
 
18 Pa.C.S. S 3927(a). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
interpreted Section 3927 as consisting of four elements: 
 
       1. The obtaining of property of another; 
 
       2. Subject to an agreement or known legal obligation 
       upon the recip[ient] to make specified payments or 
       other disposition thereof; 
 
       3. Intentional dealing with the property obtained as the 
       defendant's own; and 
 
       4. Failure of the defendant to make the required 
       disposition of the property. 
 
Commonwealth v. Turrell, 584 A.2d 882, 884 (Pa. 1990), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Ohle, 470 A.2d 61, 69 (Pa. 1983) 
and Commonwealth v. Crafton, 240 Pa.Super. 12, 16, 367 
A.2d 1092, 1094-95 (1976). See also Commonwealth v. Van 
Nest, 517 Pa. 44, 50, 534 A.2d 473, 476 (Pa. 1987). Before 
we decide whether the estate has demonstrated the 
existence of these four elements, we must first address the 
Commissioner's contention that the Section 3927 contains 
a fifth element, the presence of "thieving intent." 
 
A. Thieving Intent 
 
According to the Commissioner and the tax court, the 
estate is ineligible for a theft loss deduction because it 
failed to prove that Lynch or Reardon possessed "thieving 
state[s] of mind" when they charged excessive fees to the 
estate and failed to pay them back at the request of the 
Orphans' Court. See Meriano, T.C. Memo 1996-58 at 76, 
84. We believe the tax court's has misconstrued 
Pennsylvania's criminal law. 
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We find nothing in Pennsylvania case law to support the 
proposition that the presence of thieving intent is a 
separate and additional element of liability under Section 
3927. Neither of the two Pennsylvania Superior Court 
decisions cited by the tax court demonstrate the existence 
of a fifth element under Section 3927. See Commonwealth 
v. Kuykendall, 465 A.2d 29, 31-32 (Pa. Super. 1983); 
Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 420 A.2d 722, 726 (Pa. Super. 
1980). Neither Kuykendall nor Shaffer even mention Section 
3927. Instead, both cases stand for the unextraordinary 
principle that a person who has misappropriated property 
can be prosecuted under 18 Pa. C.S. S 3925 as a receiver of 
property, so long as that person possesses a "thieving state 
of mind." This result follows from 18 Pa. C.S.S 3902, which 
consolidates all theft offenses at trial. Thus, a defendant 
accused of one type of theft under one section of 
Pennsylvania's Crime Code may be convicted with evidence 
demonstrating a different type of theft under the Code. 
Section 3902 thus establishes that theft is a unitary offense 
in Pennsylvania. Under this consolidation of theft offenses, 
a "thieving state of mind" is the essence of a theft charge. 
Commonwealth v. Robichow, 487 A.2d 1000, 1003 (Pa. 
Super. 1985) (quoting Shaffer, 420 A.2d 722). The 
Commissioner contends that it is this "thieving state of 
mind" that is lacking here. 
 
However, the Superior Court elaborated on the unitary 
concept of theft under the Pennsylvania criminal code in 
Robichow. There, the Superior Court explained that, under 
Section 3927, the taking of another's property subject to a 
known obligation and the intentional disposition of it as 
one's own constituted the "thieving state of mind" necessary 
to prove theft. See Robichow, 338 Pa. Super. at 356, 487 
A.2d at 1004-1005. Thus, Robichow did not treat "thieving 
intent" as a separate element of Section 3927. To the 
contrary, it held that such intent was present when the 
four traditional elements of the offense were already 
present. 
 
We are aware that ultimately our determination of this 
issue turns on the pronouncements of Pennsylvania's 
highest court, not its Superior Court. "[W]hen federal courts 
are required to interpret or apply state law, we consider and 
 
                                14 
  
accept the decisions of the state's highest court as the 
ultimate authority of state law." Colantuno v. Aetna Ins. Co., 
980 F.2d 908, 909 (3d Cir. 1992). Of the recent 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases discussing Section 
3927, none has even mentioned the concept of "thieving 
intent," much less treated it as a separate prerequisite for 
criminal liability. See e.g. Turrell, 584 A.2d at 884 (criminal 
violation occurs when individual "evinces intent not to 
make the required payment or disposition"). Based on the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's discussion of Section 3927, 
we must conclude that "thieving intent" insofar as it is an 
element of an offense under section 3927, is established 
when the elements of the taking of another's property 
subject to a known obligation and of the intentional 
disposition of it as one's own have been established. It is 
not a separate fifth element of this crime. In sum, we do 
not think that the Commissioner's reading of Section 3927 
represents an accurate interpretation of Pennsylvania 
criminal law. 
 
B. Liability for Theft Under Section 3927  
 
Having rejected "thieving intent" as a fifth element, we 
now consider whether the estate proved by a 
preponderance of evidence that it was a victim of theft as 
defined by Section 3927. We will examine each element of 
Section 3927 separately. 
 
 1. Property of another. Under the first element of 
Section 3927, the estate must show that Lynch and 
Reardon took "property of another." According to the 
Commissioner, Lynch and Reardon did not acquire 
"property of another" when they converted the estate's 
securities and withdrew a portion of their proceeds from the 
estate prior to the Orphans' Court's approval of their fees. 
We disagree. We believe that under Pennsylvania's probate 
law, the moneys withdrawn from the estate constituted 
"property of another" despite Mary Orlando's prior approval 
of the estate's disbursements to Lynch and Reardon. 
 
Section 3927 does not explicitly refer to "property of 
another." Judicial precedent, however, has made it an 
element of this crime. See e.g. Turrell, 584 A.2d at 884. 
Pennsylvania statutory law defines "property of another" to 
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include "property in which any person other than the actor 
has an interest which the actor is not privileged to infringe, 
regardless of the fact that the actor also has an interest in 
the property." 18 Pa. C.S. S 3901. The Commissioner 
maintains that the definition contained in Section 3901 
applies only to statutory uses of the term. We disagree. 
Common sense dictates that the Pennsylvania courts would 
define "property of another" uniformly for all theft offenses, 
regardless of whether that term appears explicitly in the 
statute. At least one court has implicitly defined the 
"property of another" element in Section 3927 by referring 
to Section 3901. See Commonwealth v. Edwards, 582 A.2d 
1078, 1086 (Pa. Super. 1990). 
 
Applying Edwards and the language of Section 3901, we 
believe that "property of another" includes property in 
which a person has an interest that may not be infringed 
by someone else. Our conclusion is supported by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding that a victim need 
not maintain absolute title over property to claim theft by 
wrongful disposition of funds received. See Commonwealth 
v. Rosenzweig, 522 A.2d 1088, 1092-93 (Pa. 1987). Thus, 
the estate may prove theft so long as it shows that it had 
some legal interest in the securities withdrawn and 
converted by Lynch and Reardon as payment of their fees. 
 
Our review of Pennsylvania's probate law leads us to 
conclude that, prior to the Orphans' Court's audit and final 
approval of the estate's distribution, the estate maintained 
an interest in the fees withdrawn by Lynch and Reardon, 
and that neither Lynch nor Reardon was entitled to infringe 
this interest, regardless of Mary Orlando's prior approval of 
their fees and withdrawals. 
 
Although Pennsylvania probate law allows a personal 
representative (administrator or executor) to distribute real 
or personal property prior to a court's final disposition of an 
estate's account, the personal representative does so at his 
or her own risk. See 20 Pa. C.S. 3532. "Fiduciaries who pay 
out funds in their hands without an audit of their accounts 
do so at their own risk." In re Free's Estate , 194 A. 492, 
495 (Pa. 1937). See also In re Estate of Comerford, 130 A.2d 
458, 465 n. 11 (Pa. 1957); Estate of Pew, 655 A.2d 521, 
538 (Pa. Super. 1994). Cf. Heaney v. Riddle, 23 A.2d 456, 
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459 (Pa. 1942) (trustees who distributed funds of dissolved 
corporation without prior approval of court did so at their 
own risk and could be held responsible for payments later 
determined to be improper). The Orphans' Court may direct 
the estate's fiduciary to reimburse the estate if, upon 
auditing the estate's final account, the court finds the 
fiduciary's prior distributions to be improper or 
unreasonable. See In re Free's Estate., 194 A. at 495. Since 
Reardon's investigative fee was disbursed to him pursuant 
to the approval of Mary Orlando, the estate's fiduciary and 
personal representative, his fee was subject to the review 
and approval of the Orphans' Court. 
 
The payment of an attorney's fee prior to the Orphans' 
Court's audit and approval of the estate's account is also 
treated as an at-risk distribution. It is well established that 
the Orphans' Court's may review the reasonableness of the 
attorney's fee and order the estate's personal representative 
to reimburse the estate for some or all of the disbursed fees 
if it finds the fees to be excessive, unreasonable or 
otherwise undeserved. See Estate of Alla Bruner, 691 A.2d 
530, 534 (Pa. Super. 1997) (auditing judge may reduce 
excessive and unreasonable attorney's fees); In re Estate of 
Geniviva, 675 A.2d 306, 313 (Pa. Super. 1996); In re Estate 
of Rees, 625 A.2d 1203, 1206 (Pa. Super. 1993); In re 
Estate of Sonovick, 541 A.2d 374, 376 (Pa. Super. 1988) 
(Orphans' Court has authority to reduce fees and 
commissions of estate's fiduciaries to "reasonable and just" 
level).9 
 
Ordinarily, the Orphans' Court surcharges the estate's 
fiduciary for the value of excessive fees or wrongful 
appropriations. The Orphans' Court's jurisdiction, however, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In reviewing the reasonableness of an attorney's fees, the auditing 
court considers: 
 
       the amount of work performed, the character of the services 
       rendered, the difficulty of the problems encountered, the value of 
the 
       property in question, the degree of responsibility involved, the 
       professional skill of the individuals rendering the services, the 
       standing of the attorney in her profession and the ability of the 
       estate to pay a reasonable fee. 
 
Bruner, 691 A.2d at 534. 
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does not end here. Consistent with its powers as a court of 
chancery, the Orphans' Court may also compel payment 
from the fiduciary's agent when it determines that the agent 
is in possession of assets belonging to the estate. See In re 
Estate of Webb, 138 A.2d 435 (Pa. 1958) (Orphans' Court 
may compel realtors acting as administrators' agents to 
turn over property belonging to decedent's estate); In re 
Watts' Estate, 27 A. 861 (Pa. 1893) (Orphans' Court has 
jurisdiction to compel administrator's attorney to turn 
assets over to estate). 
 
Thus, the Orphans' Court clearly had the power to review 
Lynch and Reardon's fees, to reduce those fees if it found 
them to be excessive or unreasonable, and to order Lynch 
and Reardon to refund the value of any securities which the 
Court found to be wrongfully taken from the estate. As the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court proclaimed nearly a century 
ago, "[T]he orphans' court has jurisdictionfinally to decide 
the question of ownership and compel a surrender to a 
decedent's estate of assets improperly held by one whose 
title is colorable only." In re Williams' Estate, 84 A. 848, 852 
(Pa. 1912) (emphasis added). Because, the estate 
maintained a proprietary interest in any distributions prior 
to the Orphans' Court's approval, the funds withdrawn by 
Lynch and Reardon qualified as "property of another." The 
first prong of Section 3927 is therefore satisfied. 
 
 2. Subject to known legal obligation. To prove theft, 
the estate must also show that Lynch and Reardon 
obtained property subject to an agreement or known legal 
obligation to make specified payments or otherwise dispose 
of the property. The record reflects that the estate meets 
this element of Section 3927. 
 
First, Robert Boote, an attorney familiar with probate 
law, testified at trial that attorneys who took fees from their 
clients prior to an accounting "all know that [they] are 
subject to ultimate approval by the court." Appendix, at 
281-82. The Commissioner did not rebut this testimony. As 
an attorney, Lynch was aware of Pennsylvania probate law. 
Second, Lynch and Reardon both testified at trial that they 
were aware that their fees were subject to the Orphans' 
Court's approval. See Appendix, at 441; 584-85. Finally, the 
hold harmless agreement imposed a contractual obligation 
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on Lynch and Reardon to reimburse the estate for"any and 
all amounts received that are determined by a court of 
proper jurisdiction to be returnable to the Estate." 
Appendix, at 109. 
 
Thus, both Pennsylvania's probate law and the hold 
harmless agreement voluntarily entered into by Lynch and 
Reardon imposed on them a legal obligation to maintain the 
funds withdrawn from the estate until the Orphans' Court 
approved their fees. The second element of Section 3927 is 
thus present. 
 
 3. Intentional disposition of property as one's own. 
Both Lynch and Reardon disposed of the funds withdrawn 
from the estate for their own purposes. Lynch testified that 
after he converted and withdrew the securities from the 
estate, he deposited them in an account with some 
personal funds. Appendix, at 444. Shortly after the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to hear Lynch's 
appeal of the Orphans' Court's judgment, Lynch declared 
bankruptcy because he was in "financial distress." 
Appendix, at 432. From this testimony, we conclude that 
Lynch had spent the funds and thus disposed of them as 
his own.10 
 
As for Reardon, he testified at trial that he had used the 
money to pay his own legal fees and taxes. See Appendix, 
at 589-90. Thus, Reardon treated the remaining funds as 
his own. See Turell, 584 A.2d at 884 (attorney who used 
funds in client's escrow account to pay his own income 
taxes committed theft under Section 3927). 
 
 4. Failure to make required disposition. Once the 
Orphans' Court issued its judgment, Lynch and Reardon's 
obligation to repay the estate became final. Neither Lynch 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The trial court did not permit the estate to present testimony 
demonstrating that Lynch commingled the estate's funds with his own. 
We agree that commingling, by itself, does not demonstrate liability 
under Section 3927. See Turrell, 584 A.2d at 886. However, insofar as 
Lynch's commingling of funds might have been circumstantial evidence 
of his intention to treat the funds as his own, the evidence still may 
have 
been relevant and therefore admissible. We need not address this issue, 
however, since we decide the case in the estate's favor. 
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nor Reardon, however, satisfied the Orphans' Court's 
judgment. 
 
Lynch has paid the estate nothing since the Orphans' 
Court's judgment was affirmed. At trial, he testified that he 
did not have the funds to do so. Appendix, at 433. Lynch 
therefore committed theft under Section 3927 since he 
failed to dispose of the funds with the estate as directed by 
the Orphans' Court. "[A]ssuming all the other elements 
have been satisfied, once payment is required and an 
attorney fails to make such payment, then a violation of 
S 3927(a) has occurred." Turrell, 584 A.2d at 886 (attorney 
who obtained funds upon express agreement that they be 
held in escrow account committed theft when he failed to 
dispose of them in agreed upon manner). 
 
Like Lynch, Reardon also committed theft, although the 
facts surrounding his failure to repay the estate are slightly 
more complicated. At trial, Reardon testified that he had 
entered into an agreement with the estate, releasing him 
from the Orphans' Court judgment in an exchange for an 
amount less than that charged to him. The date of the 
agreement, as well as the amount Reardon agreed to pay, 
were not disclosed at trial.11 The parties apparently agree, 
however, that Reardon paid $25,000 to the estate as partial 
satisfaction of his agreement. 
 
Reardon's release and partial payment of this undisclosed 
sum does not negate our conclusion that he committed 
theft within the meaning of Section 3927. The fact that the 
estate attempted to cut its losses by negotiating a deal with 
Reardon does not negate the fact that it was the victim of 
theft. To the contrary, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The tax court accepted Reardon's testimony that the estate had 
released him from his obligation to pay the Orphans' Court's judgment 
in exchange for a negotiated lesser amount. See Meriano, T.C.Mem. 
1996-58 at 37-38, 39. Although the estate has questioned the validity of 
Reardon's agreement in supplemental briefing before this Court, it has 
not specifically challenged the tax court's finding as clearly erroneous. 
Accordingly, the estate has waived any argument about the authenticity 
of the agreement. See Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 78 (3d Cir. 
1989) (appellants must raise issue in opening appeal brief to preserve 
it). 
We therefore assume that the agreement is valid. 
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held that a defendant's restitution has no bearing on his 
criminal liability for theft: 
 
       We agree that criminal liability attaches as soon as the 
       failure to make a required distribution of funds occurs, 
       but reject the view that liability can be negated through 
       a return of the misappropriated funds. The crime is 
       complete when all of its elements have been fulfilled, 
       and, once completed, it cannot be undone. Certainly, 
       where an offender has made restitution, and 
       particularly where restitution has been made before the 
       filing of criminal charges, this can be considered by a 
       sentencing court as a significant factor in mitigation of 
       the punishment to be imposed. Restitution does not, 
       however, negate the fact that a crime has been 
       committed. 
 
Turrell, 584 A.2d at 886. As soon as Reardon failed to pay 
the Orphans' Court's judgment and spent the money on his 
own legal fees and taxes, he violated Section 3927. Neither 
the estate's release nor Reardon's later payment of $25,000 
negates that fact. 
 
In sum, the four elements of theft by failure to make 
required disposition of funds received have been satisfied 
by the facts of this case. 
 
C. Collection Efforts 
 
Finally, we note that the Commissioner questions the 
authenticity of the estate's theft claim on the ground that 
the estate failed to exercise adequate efforts to collect the 
money owed to it once the Orphans' Court rendered 
judgment against Lynch and Reardon. The Commissioner's 
argument appears to be that if theft "really" had occurred, 
the estate would have been more persistent in its efforts to 
collect the moneys owed to it. The tax court accepted this 
argument when it concluded that "this was merely a fee 
dispute between Lynch and the present administratrix of 
the estate." Meriano, T.C. Memo 1996-58 at 35.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. In describing this situation as "merely a fee dispute," the tax court 
did not take into account the requirement that fees, charged against an 
estate, must receive the ultimate approval of the Orphans' Court. See 
Part II.B.1 and 2, supra. 
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We find the reasoning of the tax court and the 
Commissioner to be without merit. The victim's pursuit of 
the person who has misappropriated its property is not an 
element under Section 3927. We believe that, once the four 
elements of Section 3927 are present, a theft has occurred, 
regardless of whether the victim attempts to retrieve the 
stolen property. Theft is measured by the thief 's, and not 
the victim's, actions and intentions. Thus, it is completely 
irrelevant how much (or little) effort the estate expended in 
trying to get its money back, or whether the estate viewed 
itself as a victim of theft immediately after the Orphans' 
Court rendered its judgment.13 
 
Our only concern is whether Lynch and Reardon 
obtained property of another, subject to a known legal 
obligation, and then intentionally treated that property as 
their own and failed to make a required disposition of 
property. Having found each of the four elements present in 
this case, we must conclude that they committed theft 
under Pennsylvania law and that the estate was entitled to 
take a theft loss deduction pursuant to Section 2054 of the 
tax code. 
 
III. THE AMOUNT DEDUCTIBLE 
 
We now turn to the issue of how much the estate may 
deduct for its theft loss under Section 2054. Although the 
estate initially argued in its opening brief that it was 
entitled to deduct the full amount of the Orphans' Court's 
judgment, it eventually conceded in supplemental briefing 
that it could not deduct the $25,000 repaid to it by 
Reardon. Thus, the estate currently claims that it is entitled 
to a deduction of $249,509.09. This amount represents the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. We do note that an estate's refusal to collect money owed to it could 
potentially disqualify it for a federal estate tax deduction under Section 
2054. Ordinarily, a taxpayer seeking a theft loss deduction on income 
tax must demonstrate that there is no "reasonable prospect of recovery." 
26 C.F.R. S1.165-1(d)(2)(I) and 1.165-8(a)(2). The Commissioner waived 
any argument with regard to this issue when she stated at trial that 
collection was not in issue. See Appendix at 445, 587, 590 and 614. 
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total amount of money owed to the estate by Lynch and 
Reardon, minus the $25,000 paid by Reardon.14 
 
Under the tax regulations, when an estate is partially 
compensated for its loss, it may take a deduction on the 
remaining portion. See 26 C.F.R. S 20.2054-1. Since the 
estate has not received any compensation from Reardon 
other than the $25,000, the estate may deduct the 
remainder of Reardon's debt, notwithstanding its agreement 
with Reardon to accept an undisclosed lesser amount. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Because the estate has demonstrated theft under Section 
3927 of the Pennsylvania criminal code, we will reverse the 
tax court's denial of a theft deduction to the estate. The 
estate is therefore entitled to deduct from its estate taxes 
the sum of $249,509.09, the remainder due to it under the 
Orphan Court's judgment. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. We note that the estate is not entitled to deduct the interest the 
Orphans' Court ordered Lynch and Reardon to pay. Federal estate tax 
applies only to the moneys contained in the estate at the time of a 
decedent's death. See generally 26 U.S.C.S 2031(a). Money generated 
after the decedent's death is not included in the gross estate for estate 
tax purposes, but is instead taxed as income under 26 U.S.C. S 641(a)(3) 
for income tax purposes. See Horne v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 100, 103 
(Tax Court 1988); Bowes v. United States, 593 F.2d 272, 275 (7th Cir. 
1979). Thus, the interest on the excess fees has never been considered 
part of the gross estate for estate tax purposes. The estate therefore may 
not include the interest on Lynch and Reardon's surcharges in its theft 
loss deduction. 
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